

NEW YORK DAILY NEWS

6 April 1987

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE C-17

LARRY ERIK NEILSON

## Young and lonely in Moscow

**W**ASHINGTON—Here is a puzzle: The KGB penetrated the inner sanctums of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow by using two of the embassy's more attractive Soviet employees, translator Violetta Seina and cook Galina Golotina, to seduce two Marine guards.

The women introduced the Marines to KGB agents, and the Marines, Sgt. Clayton Lonetree and Cpl. Arnold Bracy, allegedly allowed the KGB into the embassy for repeated forays between September 1985 and March 1986. They stole documents, blueprints, floor plans, the names of clandestine CIA officers and communications information.

According to the spy charges filed against the Marines, the two Soviet women opened up a golden pipeline into the heart of America's most sensitive operations. It was the kind of penetration long feared by outsiders who examined security at the embassy in Moscow and were shocked to find it crawling with Russian translators, drivers, electricians, mechanics, maids and bartenders—all of them potential spies.

Now the puzzle: Why did the Russians withdraw all 200 Soviet employees from the embassy last October? It does not appear to make sense—unless they wanted to do us a favor.

The Soviets said they were retaliating for the U.S. expulsion of 55 Soviet diplomats suspected of espionage. But the "retaliation" fulfilled the wishes of U.S. conservatives, like Rep. James Courter (R-N.J.), to rid the embassy of all Soviet employees. The Russians appeared to be shooting themselves in the foot.

And maybe they did. But it's hardly likely that the Foreign Ministry officials who ordered the Russian employees out of the embassy did not realize the KGB was using them to penetrate the building.

No, the Russians didn't do us any favors. The withdrawal of the Soviet employees crippled the U.S. diplomatic mission in Moscow. Chores once done by Soviet translators and Soviet air-conditioner repairmen must now be performed by U.S. nationals—who are count-

ed against a ceiling of 225 diplomats.

This reduces the number of U.S. diplomats able to devote full-time effort to diplomacy and intelligence-gathering. They are too busy trying to figure out how to operate a Russian typewriter so they can write a letter asking for more coupons to buy gasoline.

A Russian diplomat in New York who wants to buy gas whips out a \$20 bill at an Exxon station. An American in Moscow must obtain coupons from an impenetrable bureaucracy that responds only to mailed requests, typed in Russian.

The U.S. is bringing in Americans to do the jobs once done by Soviet local employees. The American workers will be much like the Marines: low on the embassy social scale, isolated from Soviet society, forbidden to fraternize with Soviet personnel, trusted as fellow Americans—and vulnerable to temptation by Soviet agents.

The Marine guards at U.S. embassies are much-beloved by the State Department and honored within the Corps. But the job is self-contradictory. They are the elite of an elite fighting force—young, healthy, adventurous men—forced to stand like mannequins on boring indoor guard duty. They must not be married and they must not even meet local girls.

Now, in addition to Marines who are expected to live like monks, the embassy will have American drivers, American hamburger cooks, American phone operators, typists and chambermaids—100 or so more potential targets for seduction.

**I**T WASN'T THE Soviet employees at the embassy who were the security threat. They were known to be KGB informants. The security threat comes from unhappy, lonely, isolated, unmarried young Americans doing boring jobs in a country they don't understand.

If the embassy is to be really secure and function well, they'd be better off bringing back the Soviet office workers and guarding the place with married men—retired police officers, for example or retired Marines. But not 21-year-old bachelors. That's asking for trouble.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE C12NEW YORK DAILY NEWS  
17 April 1987

# Worst-case (movie) scenario

J LARS-ERIK NELSON

**W**ASHINGTON—A lot of angry people down here want to start shooting Marines for espionage, so it might be a good time to puncture a balloon:

As of today, there is no evidence that any Soviet intelligence agents actually got into secure areas of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow.

Forget what Secretary of State Shultz has charged. Forget the lurid accounts in the news magazines and the demagoguery on the floor of the Congress.

U.S. security investigators have combed the aged embassy building ever since allegations were made that Marine guards Clayton Lonetree and Arnold Bracy were seduced by Soviet girl friends into letting KGB agents tour the embassy's top-secret offices at night.

The investigators have found nothing—no bugs, no hidden cameras, no missing documents, no footprints, no tainted code machines, no fingerprints. Zip.

There is no visible sign that the embassy "bubble"—the secure area insulated from all possible eavesdropping—has been tampered with. There is no evidence that Lonetree and Bracy exposed the names of any covert intelligence agents. And there is no evidence that any secret U.S. codes have been broken.

"We have lived through an extraordinary period of misinformation," a senior government official said yesterday. There is a reason for it.

**W**HENEVER THERE IS even a suspicion of successful espionage, any government must assume a "worst-case scenario"—that all of its secrets have been exposed. But that does not mean that the worst case actually occurred.

On the codes: The embassy in Moscow had to assume that its codes were at least temporarily readable by the Russians. "But with today's equipment, our communications would be vulnerable for at most a brief period," a State Department expert said.

On the allegedly betrayed Soviet agents: Lonetree may have identified CIA intelligence officers working under embassy cover as diplomats. The suggestion that he gave away the names of Soviets working for us is based on an error in the charge sheet: It says he gave away the identities of "covert U.S. intelligence agents" when, in fact, it meant CIA officers under diplomatic cover.

There is a big difference between an agent and officer: The Russians general-

ly know the identities of CIA officers at the embassy; officers enjoy diplomatic immunity, i.e., they can't be arrested and shot for espionage.

"There have been a lot of irresponsible statements," said a senior official. "What you have is one Marine (Lonetree) who turned himself in for fraternizing with a KGB agent and a second Marine (Bracy) who says Lonetree took the agent into the embassy. But there is no physical evidence other than what those two men have said."

Not that the Russians have clean hands. There is ample evidence that Lonetree, Bracy and other Marines were

enticed by the KGB into forbidden relations with Soviet women. Lonetree has further confessed to supplying the contents of "burn bags," containing classified information, to the Russians. There is also incontrovertible evidence that the Soviets installed bugs in the new embassy building.

But the more extreme scare stories just don't stand up to scrutiny.

**T**HEY BROKE INTO our embassy," Shultz said just before his departure for Moscow to confront the Russians. "They invaded our sovereign territory, and we're damned upset about it."

"If I were the secretary of state, I would not make that charge—not to the Russians—because we can't prove it," a knowledgeable official said.


In fact, another source said, Shultz complained in general about Soviet espionage during his Moscow meetings—but did not allege that Russians had penetrated the embassy.

Still, it's a great spy story: It has sex, secrets codes, nuclear arms negotiations, beautiful Soviet women and Marine guards who are looking hard at life in Leavenworth. But if any shooting begins, let it be on a movie set.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE C-17

NEW YORK DAILY NEWS  
10 April 1987

# William Webster: too slow to catch on?



LARS ERIK  
NELSON

J the FBI began an investigation to determine who was financing the clandestine missions to deliver arms to the Nicaraguan Contras.

Shipping weapons to insurgents in a country with which we are technically at peace could be a violation of the Neutrality Act. Two FBI agents visited the Miami headquarters of Southern Air Transport Inc., trying to learn more about the Hasenfus plane.

The day the investigation began, Lt. Col. Oliver North tried to stop it. FBI Director William Webster said Wednesday that North telephoned Oliver (Buck) Revell, the FBI's executive assistant director, and warned that the investigation might expose President Reagan's clandestine arms deliveries to Iran and endanger U.S. hostages in Lebanon.

North was no stranger to the FBI. "We worried about his influence in the NSC," Webster told the Senate Intelligence Committee. "He was gung-ho, tunnel-visioned and result-oriented, without a broader-gauge concern for the outcome."

Washington—On Oct. 8, three days after Sandinista soldiers captured Eugene Hasenfus near the wreckage of his C-123 cargo plane,

And he was trying to stop an FBI criminal investigation. The FBI proceeded, nonetheless. It assembled a dossier on people believed to have been financing the secret flights. The dossier was, and is, classified. It names those whom North had recruited to give private contributions to the Contras.

In late October, the FBI was about to send the dossier to the NSC. An FBI agent took the dossier for clearance to Mary Lawton, counsel of the Justice Department's office of intelligence policy and review.

Lawton saw that it contained information about clandestine aid for the Contras, noted that it was to be sent to the NSC, realized that the NSC included Oliver North—and concluded this was not kosher: North was suspected of organizing illegal aid for the Contras and North would be getting the FBI's classified files on this operation.

She told the FBI not to distribute the classified file to the NSC. On Oct. 30, the FBI agent reported to Webster that Justice was keeping classified information from the NSC on the grounds that Oliver North might be a crook.

Webster did nothing. He read the memo and forgot it. He didn't call the President and tell him that one of his White House aides was under suspicion. It apparently didn't occur to him that three weeks earlier this same aide, Oliver North, had tried to halt the investiga-

tion that produced the dossier. No light went on his mind saying, "Obstruction of justice."

Instead, on Oct. 30, Webster stopped the investigation into Southern Air. This time the request had come not from North, but from his boss, Adm. John Poindexter. That is, on the same day, Webster had on his desk a memo voicing suspicions about North, and he had a recommendation from North's boss to halt an investigation that he knew involved North. And he stopped the investigation.

On Nov. 21, Attorney General Edwin Meese told Webster he was going to try to straighten conflicting statements about the Iran deal. Webster offered FBI help. Meese turned it down. He would interview Oliver North himself.

Not until President Reagan went on television Nov. 25 to announce that North had been fired for diverting Iranian cash to the Contras did Webster realize that something had gone woefully wrong. The next day, Webster's FBI finally entered the case.

Webster is President Reagan's nominee to be director of central intelligence. He will be in charge of the intelligence community, the civilian and military organizations whose task it is to notice the frustrating and stray bits of information that make up intelligence and to assemble these maddening little pieces into a picture that makes sense.

"I have never pretended to be the expert investigator," Webster told the Intelligence Committee. The man's honesty is beyond question.



Webster: not an expert sleuth

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE C-17

NEW YORK DAILY NEWS  
4 May 1987



LARS ERIK NELSON

## It adds up to pseudo-science

**W**ASHINGTON—How wonderful is Switzerland? Very wonderful indeed. It is a 4, the most wonderful country on Earth.

The wonderfulness of Switzerland was reported by the Population Crisis Committee of Washington, D.C., which selected 10 criteria of human suffering—ranging from gross national product to personal freedom—assigned them numbers from 0 to 10, added the numbers up and then determined that the country with the lowest total has the least human suffering.

The U.S. came in with an 8, behind West Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, but ahead of Sweden and France. East Germany beat Ireland 15-23.

How powerful is the United States? Extremely powerful. It is a 468. The Soviet Union is only a 402. However, when we factor in National Will, the Soviet Union defeats the U.S., 523-421.

The U.S.-Soviet power relationship was determined by Dr. Ray Cline, a former CIA official now associated with the Center for Strategic and International Studies here.

Cline's formula for ranking the nations of the world according to their perceived power is:

$$Pp = (C + E + M) \times (S + W)$$

Pp is Perceived Power; C is Critical Mass, which is defined as the sum of population and territory; E is Economic Capability; M is Military Capability; S is Strategic Purpose and W is Will to Pursue National Strategy.

The U.S. was beating the pants off the Soviets in Critical Mass, Economic Capability and Military Capability, but then we ran up against the Strength and Will Coefficient.

According to Cline, our Strength and Will were only a 0.9. Russia's added up to 1.3. When it's all multiplied out, Russia wins.

What do all these numbers mean? Nothing. Switzerland is a nice place to live; the U.S. and Soviet Union are clearly superpowers, but the idea that these relationships can be precisely described in numbers is ludicrous.

Ludicrous to you and me, that is. To social scientists—historians, economists, sociologists and political scientists—numbers, even meaningless numbers, convey an air of scientific objectivity to what is basically their opinions. And most important, they are seldom challenged by ordinary laymen. Thus, economists rush to put their opinions into mathematical formulas. Political scientists find equations to prove their points.

The penalty for not seeming to be a scientist is severe. Harvard sociologist Paul Starr was denied professorial tenure two years ago because the sociology department felt his scholarship—which was acknowledged to be brilliant—was expressed in words rather than numerical studies. It was therefore “not science.”

If you express your beliefs in mere words, you may be dismissed as an “anecdotalist,” or worse, a journalist. The employment ads put it bluntly: College Graduate Wanted, Quantitative Major Only. That is, none of your dreamers and philosophers. America wants facts and numbers.

Last week, the National Academy of Sciences called a halt, of sorts, to the mathematical charade. It blocked the membership of Harvard political scientist Samuel Huntington, a highly respected scholar, who had used a formula to show that the “correlation” between a country's social frustration and its political instability was .5.

**O**N THE BASIS of this formula, Huntington argued that South Africa is a politically satisfied society, according to his adversary, Yale mathematician Serge Lang. “It is completely idiotic, very tendentious and insidious,” Lang said in an interview. “I object to political opinions passed off as science. This is garbage. It is political opinion embedded in a tissue of tables of numbers, statistics, percentages, correlations and variables that give the illusion of science.”

“The schools must teach students to see through that garbage. It's how Stalin used science to impose his political views on Russia.”